حمله‌ای جدید به شبکه مخلوط مرکب جیکوبسون

نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشگاه شریف

2 استاد‌یار، دانشگاه تبریز

3 استاد‌یار، پژوهشکده الکترونیک، دانشگاه صنعتی شریف

چکیده

شبکه مخلوط مرکب جیکوبسون شبکه‌ای مخلوط است که با استفاده توأم از رمزنگاری متقارن و غیر‌متقارن، گمنام‌سازی پیام‌های طولانی را به­صورتی بسیار کارا ممکن می‌سازد. در این مقاله، حمله‌ای جدید به شبکه مخلوط مرکب جیکوبسون ارائه می‌شود که ویژگی صحت این شبکه مخلوط را نقض می‌کند. نشان خواهیم داد که با استفاده از این حمله در­صورت تبانی یکی از فرستنده‌ها با اولین سرور مخلوط‌کننده، این سرور قادر خواهد بود که پیام تمامی فرستنده‌ها را با پیام‌های دلخواه خود جایگزین کند.

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