1
Researcher, Supreme National Defense university, Tehran, Iran
2
Assistant Professor, Supreme National Defense University, Tehran, Iran
Abstract
This paper focuses on investigating cyber security based on a cyber wargame by proposing a dynamic attack-defense algorithm for the interaction between attackers and defenders, where both sides dynamically adjust their strategies according to the opponent's actions to achieve victory. The phenomenon of "cyber war" exists in most real-world cyber security incidents, which requires special research and analysis. First, a theoretical framework of a zero-sum non-cooperative dynamic game is proposed for data analysis, and then it is generalized and examined in several different cases, and finally a simulated scenario is presented based on it, and the results are analyzed in terms of the success rate of defense and the energy of the entire system. The decisions of attackers/defenders are modeled based on cost or profit/loss. We examine a three-way dynamic cyber wargame with the intervention of a third agent between the attacker and the defender. A dynamic threshold cyber wargame (T,p) is presented. Finally, a cyber attack scenario on the Islamic Republic of Iran by the enemy, related to the infrastructure of the Ministry of Roads, is discussed and the effectiveness of the proposed model is reported. This paper focuses on investigating cyber security based on a cyber wargame by proposing a dynamic attack-defense algorithm for the interaction between attackers and defenders, where both sides dynamically adjust their strategies according to the opponent's actions to achieve victory. The phenomenon of "cyber war" exists in most real-world cyber security incidents, which requires special research and analysis. First, a theoretical framework of a zero-sum non-cooperative dynamic game is proposed for data analysis, and then it is generalized and examined in several different cases, and finally a simulated scenario is presented based on it, and the results are analyzed in terms of the success rate of defense and the energy of the entire system. The decisions of attackers/defenders are modeled based on cost or profit/loss. We examine a three-way dynamic cyber wargame with the intervention of a third agent between the attacker and the defender. A dynamic threshold cyber wargame (T,p) is presented. Finally, a cyber attack scenario on the Islamic Republic of Iran by the enemy, related to the infrastructure of the Ministry of Roads, is discussed and the effectiveness of the proposed model is reported.
Roohi-Seraji,R and Doustimotlagh,N . (2026). Investigating and feasibility of cyber war game using game theory. (e210938). Electronic and Cyber Defense, 14(1), e210938
MLA
Roohi-Seraji,R , and Doustimotlagh,N . "Investigating and feasibility of cyber war game using game theory" .e210938 , Electronic and Cyber Defense, 14, 1, 2026, e210938.
HARVARD
Roohi-Seraji R, Doustimotlagh N. (2026). 'Investigating and feasibility of cyber war game using game theory', Electronic and Cyber Defense, 14(1), e210938.
CHICAGO
R Roohi-Seraji and N Doustimotlagh, "Investigating and feasibility of cyber war game using game theory," Electronic and Cyber Defense, 14 1 (2026): e210938,
VANCOUVER
Roohi-Seraji R, Doustimotlagh N. Investigating and feasibility of cyber war game using game theory. Electronic and Cyber Defense. 2026;14(1):e210938 (In Persian).