Side-Channel Attack Resistance Approaches Through Dynamic Differential Logic

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

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Abstract

Cryptographic algorithms have improved in a way that algorithm-level analysis is no longer capable of obtaining their secret key. However, these systems are still vulnerable to side-channel attacks which focus on side-channel information including power consumption and electromagnetic field radiations to achieve the secret key. Dynamic differential logic is one of the most effective countermeasures against power    analysis attacks. In this approach, circuit power consumption is made flattened and uncorrelated to the  secret data. This paper concentrates on several dynamic differential logic approaches most of which are implemented on reconfigurable circuits, and are claimed to be resistant against side-channel attacks. The methods are explained and compared based on vulnerabilities, overheads and implementation details and limitations. Finally, it is concluded that less vulnerable approaches are designed at the expense of more imposed overhead. Research results show that the SDDL method with %200 and the DWDDL method with %1160 have the lowest and highest overheads respectively. However, the most resistant approach explained here, still faces some limitations in placement and routing which hinder its implementations.
 

Keywords


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Volume 7, Issue 3 - Serial Number 23
November 2019
Pages 93-104
  • Receive Date: 03 December 2018
  • Revise Date: 16 March 2019
  • Accept Date: 05 March 2019
  • Publish Date: 23 October 2019