A New And Efficient Method of Mass Masking and its Resistance Assessment to Power Analysis

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

Abstract

Differential Power Analysis (DPA) implies measuring the supply current of a cipher-circuit in an attempt
to uncover part of a cipher key. Cryptographic security gets compromised if the current waveforms
obtained correlate with those from a hypothetical power model of the circuit. In recent years, the security of
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) against DPA, has received considerable attention. This paper
presents a practical implementation of advanced encryption standard (AES-128) algorithm combined with a
simple yet effective masking scheme to protect it against differential and correlation power analysis attacks.
The proposed masking scheme has advantages of easy software implementation and lower memory requirement
compared to conventional first-order masking technique. In addition, it is robust against both first and
second-order differential power analysis. The experimental results and also the results of Welch’s T-Test
statistical analysis demonstrate that the proposed scheme has less information leakage than other existing
conventional first-order masking schemes.

Keywords

References

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History

  • Receive Date: 01 July 2017
  • Revise Date: 20 February 2019
  • Accept Date: 19 September 2018
  • Publish Date: 23 July 2018

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